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Abstract
The apprenticeship system is the most important source of formal post-secondary train-
ing in Germany. Using German register data - the IAB Employment Sample - we find
that apprentices staying with their training firm after graduation have longer first-job
durations but not higher wages than apprentices leaving the training firm. Retention
rates, first job durations, and post-apprenticeship wages are all increasing functions of
training intensity. Some implications for the ongoing debate as to why firms are willing
to invest in general training are discussed.
Keywords: Training, wages, job-duration
JEL Classification: C41, J24, J31, J44
1 Introduction
In international comparisons on education, vocational training, and labor market perfor-
mance, Germany shows a high involvement of firms in the education and training of the
young by means of a well-developed apprenticeship system with several hundreds of ac-
credited training programs. This fact is often interpreted as a positive characteristic of the
German education and labor market system, as it may contribute to low youth unemploy-
ment rates and high general skill levels of the workforce.
∗An earlier version of the paper was written while we both were at the Institute for the Study of Labor
(IZA), Bonn. It appeared as IZA Dicussion Paper No. 319 under the title “Why do firms train? Empirical
evidence on the first labor market outcomes of graduated apprentices”. We wish to thank Wiji Arulampalam,
Jan van Ours, Stefan Wolter, and our former colleagues at IZA for valuable comments and helpful discussions,
and the German Institute for Employment Research (IAB) for providing the data.
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A particular feature of German apprenticeship training (AT) is that it mainly provides
general training and thus portable skills. In addition, there is empirical evidence that firms
make substantial net investments into AT (e.g., von Bardeleben et al., 1995). The existence
of (partially) firm-financed apprenticeship training is not easily reconcilable with standard
human capital theory under perfectly competitive labor markets according to which profit
maximizing firms should not pay for general training but rather free-ride on the investment
of others. Most explanations in the literature introduce some sort of market imperfection
which allow training firms to recoup the costs of the training by extracting rents from the
graduated apprentices who stay with the training firm. Such explanations are based on
asymmetric information on the ability of apprentices (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998), high
mobility costs and low general labor turnover in the German labor market (Harhoff and
Kane, 1997), or compressed wage structures (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a, 1999b). In
these models firms are able to pay post- apprenticeship wages below marginal productivity
and thus earn a return on their investment.
Concurrently, a number of empirical studies have investigated various aspects of AT.
Two recent papers use firm level data to estimate the firms’ demand functions for appren-
tices (Dietrich, 2000, Fouge`re and Schwerdt, 2001). Other papers have used individual
level survey data to establish the wage returns to apprenticeship training (Winkelmann,
1996b), the effect of post-apprenticeship mobility on wages and wage growth (Werwatz,
1996, Winkelmann, 1996a, Dustmann et al., 1997, Clark, 2001, Bougheas and Georgellis,
2001), the wage effects of moves out of the training occupation (Werwatz, 1997, Clark,
2000), and the incidence of unemployment and non-employment spells during the transi-
tion from apprenticeship to regular employment (Winkelmann, 1996a, Franz et al. 2000,
Franz and Zimmermann, 2000, Riphahn, 2002).
Despite the substantial size of the literature, few ”stylized” facts have emerged. One
of the recurrent findings is that about 70 percent of apprentices stay with their training
firm initially after graduation, whereas the fraction of those staying for five years or longer
is about one-third. Also, retention rates tend to be higher in larger firms than in smaller
firms. More often than not, the empirical evidence is inconclusive or even contradictory.
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For instance, there are no robust results available so far, whether jobs are more stable and
wages higher for those AT graduates staying in the training firm than for those moving on
to another firm. And yet, this type of evidence is crucial for understanding the nature of
the AT, including the firms’ motivation to contribute to it.
We argue in this paper that the lack of solid evidence is in part due to shortcomings of
the data sources used in the previous literature, and we set out to address this deficit by
using a more appropriate dataset that has become recently available. The problem with
previous data sets, such as the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) or the German
Qualification and Career survey (Q&C survey), is that in order to understand the effect
of AT on the trainees’ skills and labor market choices, it is most instructive to study the
period immediately following the apprenticeship, when the external labor market comes to
its fullest force and before a host of other influences has obscured these initial relationships.
In the GSOEP, apprentices can be observed during their transition to employment in
principle. However, the number of observed transitions is relatively small. The Q&C survey,
by contrast, is large, with 20-30 thousand observations. However, people in the survey
completed their apprenticeship training on average almost 20 years before the survey date.
While some retrospective information is available, in particular on the transition pattern,
its reliability is doubtful. Moreover, immediate post-apprenticeship wages are not collected
at all. Finally, it is unclear whether the experiences of AT graduates of some twenty or
thirty years ago have any close relation to the experiences of current and future cohorts of
labor market entrants.
In our study, we overcome these difficulties by using official German social security
register data. We have access to the IAB Employment Sample, a one percent sample of
the complete employment histories of all workers subject to social security contributions
at least once between 1975 and 1995. Even after restricting the sample to the part of the
male cohort born between 1960 and 1965 who completed apprenticeship training, we retain
16,281 observations. The official register data provide accurate records on wages paid, as
well as on job durations (with daily accuracy). The dataset offers a unique opportunity
to provide more reliable empirical evidence on several of the key issues discussed in the
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literature.
A second contribution of our paper is that we are able to analyze an additional aspect
of apprenticeship training that has been neglected hitherto, namely the question of how
variation in training intensity affects the first labor market outcomes of AT graduates. We
are able to derive two new indicators of training intensity from the data, and we study how
training intensity affects retention rates, post-apprenticeship wages, and first-job durations.
2 The Importance of Training Heterogeneity
Previous commentators have pointed out that the coexistence of “low-quality” and “high-
quality” apprenticeship is a central feature of the German apprenticeship system (e.g.,
Steedman, 1993). This coexistence can explain why AT attracts school leavers with univer-
sity entrance qualification headed for skilled jobs as well as less educated youths headed for
semi-skilled employment. The breadth of AT may also increase adaptability of the system
to structural changes in the labor market.
Failure to properly control for this quality component – the intensity of training and the
amount of the firm’s investment – affects the interpretation of previous empirical results
in this area. The basic mechanisms we have in mind are as follows. First, firms providing
more intensive training have a larger incentive to retain their apprentices. Conversely,
firms which, for instance for technological reasons, find it optimal to heavily invest in their
apprentices have a larger disincentive to train beyond their own expected needs for skilled
worker recruitment than firms with a lower investment. They take on relatively fewer
apprentices and offer skilled workers contracts to a higher proportion, if not to all, of them.
Thus, immediate retention rates should be an increasing function of training intensity.
Second, post-apprenticeship wages should be an increasing function of training intensity
as well. This is simply due to the fact that wages are linked to marginal productivity
if workers can potentially move to other firms. Wages may not increase one-to-one with
marginal productivity if part of the training is firm-specific, or if information problems or
mobility barriers reduce the value of the outside option. Still, a positive association is to be
expected. An immediate consequence is that mover-stayer post-AT wage differentials are
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underestimated in models that ignore training intensity, because movers tend to be trained
less intensively.
Third, the link between training intensity and the duration of the first job is likely
positive as well. High-investment training firms have a larger incentive to offer a wage
schedule that reduces turnover than low-investment firms. Although the initial investment
cost are sunk at this stage, both training firm and outside firm are likely to engage in
continuing on-the-job training, the amount of which typically is higher for more skilled
workers, in this case apprentice graduates with high training intensity.
From the above, it is clear that training intensity is an important variable when analysing
AT. Yet, training intensity is difficult to measure. The variables used in past research,
most importantly occupation and firm size, do capture some aspects of training intensity.
Unfortunately, their interpretation is difficult. First, while training intensity typically varies
from occupation to occupation, so do a number of other things that affect labor market
outcomes of graduates as well, such as skilled worker demand. This is even more so for
firm size. Larger firms tend to have a larger training intensity, but they also have a larger
internal labor market, which facilitates higher retention rates. The two effects complement
each other.
We propose here two alternative indicators for training intensity, both of them con-
structed from the IAB data, that we find potentially superior. The first indicator is the
wage paid during the apprenticeship training, twelve month after the beginning of training.
It is known that the AT-programs with the most demanding training component also pay
high wages. A reason may be that higher paying firms are able to attract more able ap-
prentices, which is more relevant under high training intensity, assuming that ability and
training are complements in the production of skills. In addition, there is a complemen-
tarity between training and capital intensity. Technologically more advanced firms have an
incentive to pay higher training wages. Finally, training wages have a direct positive impact
on the firms’ training investment because of the cost and regardless of training intensity.
A second indicator is the duration of the apprenticeship. We classify apprenticeships as
“short”, “medium” or “long”, depending on whether the duration up to December 31 of the
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year prior to graduation was less than 2 years, 2-3 years, or longer than 3 years. The AT
duration is an indicator of the firms’ investment as national regulations of training content
and intensity prevent firms from prolonging apprenticeships beyond what is necessary from
a training point of view.
3 The IAB Employment Data
The data for this study are drawn from the IAB Employment Sample 1975-1995, which is a
one percent sample of employment histories of all workers in former West Germany with at
least one recorded spell during the 21-year period (see Bender, Haas and Klose, 2000). The
selected subsample includes observations on 16,281 male apprentices born between 1960
and 1965.1.
As the data come from official registers, accuracy is an important advantage. By law
all employers are required to report information on their workforce to the German Social
Security Administration, who administers the health insurance, statutory pension, and
unemployment insurance. The population includes all workers and salaried employees, as
long as they are not exempt from paying social security contributions. Exempt are civil
servants, family workers (without pay), and those in marginal employment (this exemption
was removed in 1999). Remarkably, and for the purpose of our study of great importance,
the data also include apprentices who, regardless of their wages, are treated as regular
employees by the social security system. All in all, the employee register covered nearly 80
percent of all employed persons in West Germany in 1995.
The data set has an event-history format that differs substantially from usual survey
data such as the GSOEP or the Q&C survey. It is organized in terms of spells between
“notifiable” events. Notifiable events include the start and termination of employment at
a certain employer, and an obligatory end-of-year notification for continuing employment
relations. Thus the maximum duration between two notifications is 365 days. Apart from
1Since the data start in 1975 and end in 1995, we observe the labor market histories for this cohort
from the age of 15 to the age of 30- 35, which means that we observe all AT spells from the beginning.
Moreover, the length of the observed post-apprenticeship labor market history is sufficient to measure the
first employment spell without excessive right-censoring. See Bender and Dietrich, 1994, for details on
identification of apprenticeship spells in the IAB data
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notifications by employers, records from the social security administration are used to fill
in information on unemployment spells, if any, and type of termination. Gaps in a worker’s
history indicate any period during which a worker either took up exempt employment or
left the labor force.
Each spell-record provides information on the starting and end dates (in days), a per-
sonal identifier and an establishment number. Further variables include individual and
family characteristics such as gender, year of birth, nationality, marital status, and highest
qualification. In addition, each spell- record includes an occupational code, gross earnings2,
an industry code and the size of the establishment (number of workers).
The rules underlying the generation of this dataset imply that it is not possible in all
cases to properly identify the day and month of apprenticeship completion.3 Formally,
apprentices can be in one of three states on the day following graduation: they continue
working in the training firm, they immediately switch to a new employer, or they stop
being employed. From the viewpoint of the IAB data, the second and third options imply
termination of employment at the training firm. In these cases, a notification is given by
the training firm, and the exact termination date of the apprenticeship is known. If the
apprentice is retained as a regular employee, no notification is made. In this case, the
mandatory end-of-year-notification by the training firm, now employer, reveals two status
changes: the notified occupational status changes from ”apprentice” to ”skilled worker” and
the educational level changes from ”without vocational qualification” to ”with vocational
qualification”. Only the year of graduation is known for these workers. We adopt the
following two definitions:
Stayer A stayer is an apprentice whose first job after apprenticeship is in the training firm.
Mover A mover is an apprentice whose first job after apprenticeship is in a firm other than
the training firm.
This definition allows for a non-employment gap between apprenticeship and first job for
2Earnings are top coded but the censoring threshold is not reached for any of the observed apprenticeship-
or first post-apprenticeship wages
3The final certification process is frequently completed in early summer but many exceptions exist.
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both movers and stayers. This is important, since many young men are drafted into the
army (for 15 months) following their training. If such a person returns to the same firm
after the military, he is classified as a stayer. Similarly, for men who are drafted while in
their first job, the first job duration is calculated as the sum of the employment durations
before and after the military related leave of absence.
In slight abuse of language, we often use the term “firm” when the data really identify
only establishments. This is a certain weakness, as one cannot distinguish workers moving
within a multi-establishment firm from those moving between such firms. Both types of
move lead to a change of establishment number. This aspect may tend to overstate the
post-apprenticeship mobility somewhat, in particular for sectors and occupations where
multi-establishment firms are prevalent.
4 Empirical Results
Table 1 shows the mean values for selected variables, both overall and by birth cohort.
Observations are almost equally distributed over the six cohorts. The average apprentice
is 17 years old when he starts to train, with an upward trend. The proportion of trainees
with Abitur increased steadily from 3 percent for the 1960 cohort to 6 percent for the 1965
cohort. Both the increased starting age and the increased proportion of apprentices with
Abitur result from the secular trend towards higher schooling. In response to this trend,
new apprenticeship programs were developed and existing ones modified in order to cater
for the more educated as well.
——— TABLE 1 ———–
The Table shows that very few apprentices are married. Only 2 to 3 percent are for-
eigners, substantially less than the overall proportion of non-Germans in the labor force
(around 10 percent). This underrepresentation indicates that foreigners are less likely to
start an apprenticeship than German nationals, even if they are second generation.
A substantial fraction of training occurs in very small or small firms. For example, 65
percent of all apprentices are trained in firms with less than 50 employees. 19 percent of all
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apprentices are trained in very large firms with more than 500 employees. On average, the
daily wage one year after starting training was 19.6 Deutsche Marks for the 1960 cohort,
increasing by 9.7 percent (keeping prices constant in 1985 Deutsche Mark) to 21.5 Deutsche
Mark for the 1965 cohort. 25 percent of all apprenticeships observed in the sample were of
short duration, 53 percent of medium duration and 22 percent of long duration.
Finally, there is some information on the transition from AT to work. Unemployment
spells and non-participation spells are quite common between training and the first job.
Episodes of non-participation relate in many cases to mandatory military service (or its
substitute for conscientious objectors). The risk of unemployment was highest for appren-
tices born in 1964 who entered the labor market around 1984. The correlation between
the immediate post- apprenticeship unemployment incidence and the official German un-
employment rate is about 0.9. Thus, the transition is affected by the business cycle, a
relationship that Franz and Zimmermann (1999) study in more detail. The overall reten-
tion rate of trainees in their training firm was 71 percent.4 Again, there is a strong cyclical
component. The retention rate is lowest for the cohort that entered the labor market at
peak unemployment.
4.1 The immediate retention rate
About 71 percent of the graduated apprentices start working in their training firm. They
are, following our above definition, stayers. The remaining 29 percent are movers. Table 2
presents estimation results for linear probability models in which the dependent variable is
1 if the apprentice is a stayer and 0 if he is a mover. Three different models were estimated,
including successively more explanatory variables. The most basic model in column (1)
includes indicator variables for firm size only. The smallest size (1-9 employees) is the
reference size. The coefficients confirm the findings in the previous literature based on
different datasets. Retention rates are an increasing function of firm size. They increase
from 66 percent for the small firms to 75 percent for very large firms with more than 500
4Note that both stayers and movers can have episodes of unemployment or non-employment between AT
and first employment. For this reason, the percentages don’t add up to 100.
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employees.
——— TABLE 2 ———–
The next model in column (2) adds a number of demographic variables as well as controls
for training intensity. An F -test clearly confirms the joint significance of the additional
variables. However, the demographic variables are individually rather unimportant. We
find, as expected, that the effect of training intensity is large and highly significant. A
10 percent increase in the wage received during the apprenticeship increases the retention
rate by 2 percentage points. Similarly, the retention rate increases with the duration of
the apprenticeship. Incidentally, the magnitude of the duration effect is substantially larger
than the firm size effect noted in model (1). We find a 16 percentage point difference in
the retention rate between short and long apprenticeships. This effect is relatively robust
to the inclusion of year and occupational dummies, which both are highly significant as a
group. In other words, there is sufficient variation in training intensity within each of the
48 occupations to identify an intensity effect, and it is found to be large. The firm size
effect, by contrast, is quite unstable once further variables are included in the model. In
model (3), for instance, there is no longer any significant difference of having been trained
in a firm with 10-49 employees or in a firm with 500+ employees.
4.2 Duration of the First Job
The second important determinant for a training firm’s ability to recoup the costs of training
is the duration of the first job. Training firms profit from long first job durations of their
trained apprentices not only in the sense that they make use of their skills for a long time,
but also in the sense that it keeps recruitment costs low.
There are two studies that have analyzed the duration of the first job after appren-
ticeship before: Winkelmann (1996a) and Franz and Zimmermann (1999). Winkelmann,
using data from the GSOEP, reports five year retention rates of 30 percent, whereas Franz
and Zimmermann, based on a sample from the 1991/2 German Qualification and Career
Survey, including both men and women, find retention rates after five years of about 35
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percent. In contrast, our estimated five-year retention rate is only 19 percent. A number
of possible explanations for the discrepancy between our estimate based on register data
and the previous estimates based on survey information come to mind. One is that looking
at men only, or at men and women jointly, may make a difference. Second, register data
are more accurate almost by definition. For instance, very short job spells at the start of
ones career might be “overlooked” in surveys. Second, some of the discrepancy might be
explained by definitional differences between establishments (in the register) and firms (in
the surveys). In any case, it is clear that there is a large amount of job churning at the
beginning of people’s careers.
Based on a first job duration analysis for stayers, Franz and Zimmermann (1999) con-
clude that durations are longer for large firms and firms in the industrial sector. Winkelmann
(1996a) compared the first job duration of the movers and stayers and found, somewhat
counterintuitively, that movers tend to have longer durations than stayers. We have now
the chance to settle this issue with much better quality data, and including controls for
training intensity.
In principle, the job duration t is measured on a daily basis, which is precise enough
to treat it as a continuous variable. However, for stayers we observe only an upper and a
lower bound for the first job duration, and hence the likelihood contribution for stayers is
discrete. A parametric duration model is ideal to handle such a mixed discrete-continuous
duration problem, and we start from a mixed proportional hazard rate model.
The hazard rate (or instantaneous exit rate) λ(t|x, ε) is defined as the limit of the
probability that the spell is completed during the interval t+ h given that it has not been
completed before time t, for h → 0. Define a vector of individual characteristics x, a
conformable parameter vector β, and an unobserved individual heterogeneity term ε and
let
λ(t|x, ε) = λ0(t) exp(x′β + ε) (1)
where λ0(t), the baseline hazard, is common to all individuals and allows for (non-monotonic)
duration dependence. For any hazard function, it holds that the survivor function S(t) is
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given by
S(t) = exp
[
−
∫ t
0
λ(s)ds
]
t ≥ 0
Conditional on ε, the survivor function of the proportional hazard model has a particularly
simple form:
S(t|x, ε) = exp
[
−
∫ t
0
λ0(s)ds exp(x′β + ε)
]
(2)
Moreover, one obtains the density f(t|x, ε) by differentiation of F (t|x, ε) = 1 − S(t|x, ε)
with respect to t:
f(t|x, ε) = λ(t|x, ε) exp
[
−
∫ t
0
λ0(s)ds
]
(3)
Thus, one has the basic inputs for maximum likelihood estimation, namely the density for
non-censored observations and the survivor function for censored observations. However,
to fully specify the model, we need to integrate the likelihood contributions over ε, and
to specify parametrically the baseline hazard. First, we assume that u = exp(ε) is gamma
distributed independently of x with expectation 1 and variance σ2 (Lancaster, 1979, Abbring
and Van den Berg, 1998). The closed form of the survivor function conditional on x can be
shown to be
S(t|x) =
[
1 + σ2
∫ t
0
λ0(s)ds exp(x′β)
]−(1/σ2)
(4)
with corresponding density
f(t|x) = λ0(t) exp(x′β)
[
1 + σ2
∫ t
0
λ0(s)ds exp(x′β)
]−(σ2+1)/σ2
(5)
Second, we specify a piecewise constant baseline hazard. In the most general case, we would
estimate a different parameter for each day such that λ0(t) = λt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T , where T
represents the maximum possible number of days. The integrated hazard is simply∫ t
0
λ(s)ds =
t∑
i=1
λi
As estimating T parameters would be too demanding, even with our large number of ob-
servations, we impose equality restrictions on these parameters on a monthly or yearly
basis.
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To tackle the problem of imprecisely measured first job durations for stayers, we proceed
as follows. We know that the realized duration t is between a certain observed minimum
duration tmin and a certain observed maximum duration tmax. The probability of such an
observation is:
P (tmax ≥ t > tmin|x) = S(tmin|x)− S(tmax|x) (6)
A third type of observation occurs due to the limited observation period: observations are
right censored if graduates are still in their first job on December 31, 1995. Taking the
three different kinds of observations together, the log-likelihood function can be written as
logL(β, σ2) =
∑
uncensored
log f(t|x) +
∑
partly censored
log[S(tmin|x)− S(tmax|x)] +
∑
right censored
logS(t|x)
In the spirit of the foregoing discussion, we are most interested in finding out, whether
movers and stayers have different patterns with regard to their labor mobility and thus job
durations, once we control for training intensity and other variables. We stratify the model
by allowing for separate baseline hazards for movers and stayers. This approach is more
general, and thus potentially more informative, than just allowing a proportional difference
in the baseline for movers and stayers, as would be obtained if a dummy were included
among the regressors.
——— TABLE 3 ———–
Table 3 presents the maximum likelihood estimation results, again for three model ver-
sions. A first model includes the demographic variables, the training firm size dummies
(which equal the first-job firm size for stayers but not necessarily so for movers) and a
set of indicator variables for year and occupation. In a second model, the training inten-
sity variables are added, while in a third, we add two further dummy variables capturing
whether movers move to a smaller or to a larger firm. This last model specification ac-
counts for the fact that movers frequently, although by no means exclusively, move to larger
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establishments where job durations tend to be longer. An alternative, almost equivalent,
specification would add separate controls for training firm size and first-job firm size.
We start with a remark on the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity term u. Given
the substantial standard errors, the null hypothesis of the absence of unobserved hetero-
geneity is not rejected. This is not an uncommon finding, given that our baseline hazard is
specified very flexibly and identification becomes a problem. We still decided to maintain
the model with unobserved heterogeneity in order to protect estimates against spurious
duration dependence.
Likelihood ratio tests show that model (3) is the preferred specification. Among the
individual characteristics, marital status and pre-AT schooling have significant impacts: a
graduated apprentice married at the time of starting the first job has a longer expected
first job duration, as does an apprentice with Abitur. Both effects are quite large, as
Abitur lowers the baseline hazard by approximately 42 percent, while being married lowers
the baseline hazard by approximately 24 percent, a typical mobility cost effect. The age
polynomial is insignificant, a result easily explained by the relative homogeneity of the
sample since we look at men at the start of their careers only.
The training intensity variables are highly significant. For instance, a ten percent in-
crease in the apprenticeship wage reduced the hazard of leaving ones first job by three
percent. There is also strong evidence for substantial firm size effects, with lower hazards
for employees in larger firms. In our specification, this expresses itself for movers in an
increased hazard for those who move to a smaller firm and decreased hazard for those who
move to a smaller firm (relative to the size of the training firm).
Figure 1 shows the stratified baseline hazard for movers and stayers for an otherwise
identical representative individual.5 According to theories based on asymmetric information
and learning, the hazard rates should be different especially in the first months as for the
stayers some information should be revealed already during the training period. Formal
5The reference person has German nationality, is 18 years old, unmarried, has no Abitur, ln(wage) = 3,
medium training duration and the size of both training firm and employment firm is 50-499.
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tests on the hazard rates reject the null hypothesis of no difference.
——— Figure 1 ———–
With the exception of the first quarter, the probability of leaving the first job is indeed
larger for movers than for stayers over the first three years. The largest differences occur
between month 4 and month 12 after which differences become small. A likely explanation
for the initial “excess separation rate” of stayers is an institutional one. Even if employers
and apprentices agree to eventually separate, it is not uncommon that a temporary skilled-
worker contract is offered in order to give apprentices time to search for another job, or
to bridge a the temporary gap until the start of military service. In some industries, such
temporary retention clauses are even part of collective bargaining agreements.
Figure 2 shows how these hazard rates translate into predicted survivor rates. After 1
year the survivor probability of stayers is larger than the survivor probability for movers.
After 5 years the survivor probability of stayers is about 11 percent above the survivor rate
of movers. Therefore a stayer trained and employed by a firm of a certain size has a longer
first job durations than a mover trained and employed by a firm of the same size.
——— Figure 2 ———–
However, the differences are not as large as one might expect. One can compare the
mover-stayer differential to the effects of variations in other variables. For example, the five
year retention rate of stayers with long AT duration exceeds the five year retention rate of
stayers with medium AT duration by 10 percent.
Also, one can argue about the correct measurement of first job durations for stayers.
One possibility is to set the clock back to zero once regular employment starts, as in Figures
1 and 2. The other possibility is to add the time of the apprenticeship to the overall job
duration. Clearly, the job termination hazards of stayers would then exceed the hazards of
movers at all comparable durations.
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4.3 First Wages after Apprenticeship
A particular advantage of our data is that we observe the wages in the first job after the
apprenticeship, whereas most other empirical studies on the AT observe the wages many
years after the apprenticeship. Wages are measured on a daily basis (including weekends
and holidays) in real 1985 DM. For the first wage in the first job we actually have to use the
wage of the second notification in the first job, as for stayers the wage of the first notification
is a weighted average of the last wage as an apprentice and the first wage in the first job.
Using the wage of the second notification means that some selection is present in the data;
some of the graduated apprentices have left the first job by then. This is the case for about
31 and 27 percent of the movers and stayers respectively. Secondly, for some apprentices
the wage of the second notification is missing, as they did not receive a wage from their
employer for that observational period (mostly due to mandatory military service). This is
the case for about 2 percent of movers, and about 4 percent of stayers. Overall, the sample
of valid observations is reduced from 16,281 to 11,199.
——— TABLE 4 ———–
Table 4 presents the results for three different specifications. The first specification is
a conventional model without the training intensity variables. Individual characteristics
such as age, nationality, and Abitur each have a significant positive impact on the wage.
Moreover, wages increase monotonously with the size of the training firm size. As the next
model shows, much of the training firm size effect is due to the omission of training intensity
as separate variables. The elasticity of post training wages with respect to training wages
is 0.27. Similarly, there is a large premium for trainees with long training duration.
The inclusion of the training intensity variables also affects the stayer-mover differential
which was insignificant in the first model. With training intensity variables included, there
is a significant positive differential for movers, albeit of small magnitude (2.8 log points).
The change confirms our initial conjecture that not controlling for training intensity will
tend to lead to a downward bias in the mover-stayer differential (as the mover dummy is
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negatively correlated with training intensity).
Why do movers command higher wages? 36.5 percent of all movers move to firms
larger than their training firm; 29.0 percent of all movers move to firms smaller than their
training firm. Thus, the direction of mobility is far from uniform. However, there is a
slight dominance of “upward” mobility. Moving to a larger sized firm can be expected to
be associated with a wage gain, as moving to a smaller firm leads to a wage loss. This is
confirmed by the third column of Table 4 that shows that the premium of “moving up” is a
14.9 log point wage gain, while “moving down” is associated with a 10.7 log point wage loss.
There is no mover stayer wage differential once we consider movers staying in the same size
class.
5 Conclusion
The main goal of our analysis was to study the transition of apprenticeship trainees into their
first job. Specifically, we studied the retention rates, the first job durations as well as initial
post-apprenticeship wages. We argued that the IAB Employment sample is particularly
well suited for this task, due to its accuracy, the long observation period (1975-95), and the
large number of observations. Moreover, we emphasized the importance of controlling for
training intensity, and showed that two relevant indicators of training intensity are available
in the IAB data.
Using these data, we provided new evidence on two questions on which previous studies
using alternative data sources have offered conflicting evidence. The first question was
whether apprentices who are retained in the training firm receive higher or lower wages
than apprentices who move to a new employer. Our finding is that there is no systematic
wage differential between movers and stayers, once we control for training intensity and
firm size. The second question was the relationship between apprenticeship training and
the duration in the first job.
We find that retained graduated apprentices stay longer in their first job than appren-
ticeship graduates recruited by another firm. The difference, while statistically significant,
may however be small in economic terms. Taken together, small differences in wages and
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rather similar first job durations for movers and stayers tend to suggest that the ability of
firms to extract rents from their trainees may be limited. What we cannot exclude, however,
is that a generally compressed wage structure has some beneficial effects for training firms.
On the basis of the large mobility directly after graduation and the rather small differ-
ences in the first-job durations and wages we conclude that the knowledge obtained during
apprenticeship training is quite transferable. This certainly is a benefit and strength of a
system that provides post-secondary education for almost two thirds of youth in Germany.
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Fig 2. Survivor functions, movers and stayers
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Birth year 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 Total
Demographics:
German 0.984 0.987 0.979 0.977 0.969 0.970 0.978
Age at start of AT 16.5 16.9 17.0 17.0 17.1 17.2 17.0
Married 0.034 0.034 0.024 0.026 0.025 0.022 0.027
Abitur 0.030 0.032 0.042 0.050 0.049 0.061 0.044
Characterization of AT:
Daily wage 19.6 20.2 20.8 21.3 21.6 21.5 20.8
Short duration 0.301 0.242 0.257 0.254 0.249 0.225 0.255
Medium duration 0.496 0.533 0.530 0.540 0.532 0.545 0.529
Long duration 0.203 0.266 0.213 0.206 0.219 0.230 0.216
1-9 employees 0.280 0.247 0.243 0.260 0.243 0.248 0.254
10-49 employees 0.283 0.304 0.305 0.292 0.299 0.280 0.294
50-499 employees 0.252 0.255 0.255 0.260 0.260 0.271 0.259
500+ employees 0.186 0.194 0.197 0.188 0.198 0.201 0.194
Employment transition:
Stay with training firm 0.754 0.737 0.706 0.697 0.675 0.691 0.710
Unemployment 0.082 0.112 0.170 0.192 0.219 0.191 0.162
Further AT 0.024 0.022 0.025 0.027 0.020 0.023 0.023
Not in labor force 0.214 0.222 0.239 0.250 0.265 0.254 0.241
Number of observations 2790 2623 2511 2725 2857 2775 16281
Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Source: IAB sample, own calculations.
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(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.6577 -0.0023 0.0520
(0.0074) (0.3473) (0.3468)
German national -0.0846 -0.0681
(0.1111) (0.1096)
Age -0.0313 -0.0229
(0.0341) (0.0339)
Age2 0.0004 0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Married -0.0016 -0.0097
(0.0370) (0.0366)
Abitur 0.0538*** 0.0178
(0.0195) (0.0203)
Ln(training wage) 0.1952*** 0.1440***
(0.0122) (0.0157)
Medium AT duration 0.1267*** 0.1235***
(0.0093) (0.0093)
Long AT duration 0.1618*** 0.1547***
(0.0117) (0.0125)
10-49 employees 0.0618*** 0.0426*** 0.0555***
(0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0101)
50-499 employees 0.0630*** 0.0189* 0.0395***
(0.0101) (0.0106) (0.0117)
500 + employees 0.0903*** 0.0185* 0.0644***
(0.0107) (0.0116) (0.0136)
Year dummies (19) no no yes***
Occupation dummies (47) no no yes***
R-squared 0.0050 0.0404 0.0698
Table 2: Linear probability estimates for stayer (y = 1) / mover (y = 0) model. Het-
eroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses (N = 16281).
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(1) (2) (3)
German national -0.0311 -0.0465 -0.0145
(0.1543) (0.1566) (0.1545)
Age 0.0630 0.0561 0.0676
(0.1769) (0.1779) (0.1776)
Age2 -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0011
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041)
Married -0.2389 -0.2414 -0.2396
(0.1506)* (0.1500)* (0.1492)*
Abitur -0.4198 -0.4249 -0.4105
(0.2355)* (0.2308)* (0.2331)*
Ln(training wage) -0.3177 -0.3338
(0.0990)*** (0.0977)***
Medium AT duration -0.1070 -0.1064
(0.0574)* (0.0566)*
Long AT duration -0.2085 -0.2069
(0.0759)*** (0.0748)***
10-49 employees -0.0048 -0.0103 -0.0441
(0.0605) (0.0605) (0.0613)
50-499 employees -0.1312 -0.0876 -0.1459
(0.0691)* (0.0703) (0.0728)**
500 + employees -0.4416 -0.3696 -0.4365
(0.0880)*** (0.0903)*** (0.0939)***
Move to smaller firm 0.2045
(0.1039)**
Move to larger firm -0.3027
(0.1009)***
σˆ2 0.1401 0.1394 0.1298
(0.1366) (0.1301) (0.1163)
Log-likelihood -12773.5 -12763.6 -12742.8
Table 3: Results for proportional hazard model for first job duration (for baseline hazard
and survivor rates of movers and stayers, see figures 1 and 2). Other exogenous variables
include dummy variables for year and occupation (N=16281).
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(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 1.8189 1.5795 1.6364
(0.2671)*** (0.2688)*** (0.2625)***
German national 0.1223 0.1075 0.0723
(0.0631)* (0.0595)* (0.0505)
Age 0.1931 0.1408 0.1339
(0.0246)*** (0.0244)*** (0.0238)***
Age2 -0.0036 -0.0026 -0.0024
(0.0006)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0005)***
Married 0.0243 0.0217 0.0192
(0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0177)
Abitur 0.2287 0.2488 0.2334
(0.0277)*** (0.0279)*** (0.0269)***
Ln(training wage) 0.2727 0.2660
(0.0142)*** (0.0140)***
Medium AT duration 0.1234 0.1217
(0.0089)*** (0.0088)***
Long AT duration 0.1869 0.1824
(0.0111)*** (0.0109)***
10-49 employees 0.0263 0.0122 0.0401
(0.0093)*** (0.0091) (0.0090)
50-499 employees 0.1066 0.0627 0.1082
(0.0099)*** (0.0100)*** (0.0100)***
500 + employees 0.1786 0.1106 0.1676
(0.0115)*** (0.0117)*** (0.0117)***
Mover 0.0016 0.0276 0.0076
(0.0078) (0.0076)*** (0.0111)
Move to smaller firm -0.1065
(0.0110)***
Move to larger firm 0.1485
(0.0143)***
R-squared 0.2410 0.2837 0.3049
Table 4: Linear regression for the logarithm of wages in the first job. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Other exogenous variables include dummy variables for year and occupation
(N=11199).
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